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Democratic consolidation calls for free and fair elections, the democratic
transfer of political power, legitimacy, transformed legal frameworks, free
market economy, and, perhaps, most crucially, democratic civil-military
relations (CMR). Also necessary is establishing new security institutions,
including intelligence agencies, that are under democratic civilian control,
while also being effective.1 A particular challenge of the democratic
consolidation of security agencies involves addressing—and hopefully
overcoming—the legacies of their non-democratic past, including grave
human rights abuses. Coming to terms with the non-democratic past is
crucial. As Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter have noted,
“It is difficult to imagine how a society can return to some degree of
functioning which would provide social and ideological support for
democracy without somehow coming to terms with the most painful elements
of its own past.”2
Virtually all the world’s emerging democracies have faced that challenge:
from Spain, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador to South Africa,
Indonesia, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Romania. Some emerging
democracies opted to leave the past behind and start afresh (Spain), or
provide a “formal” apology by the new governments for the atrocities of the
earlier non-democratic regimes (Chile). Other developing democracies have
opted for specific avenues that would enable them to balance their citizens’
dual demands for accountability of the past transgressions and reconciliation.
These avenues or mechanisms, known as “transitional justice,” generally
involve the prosecution of the perpetrators (Argentina); exposure of past
abusers by opening the archives of the old regimes (Central and
Eastern Europe); lustration (Central and Eastern Europe), meaning the
banning of past abusers from government positions; and, Committees of
Truth and Reconciliation (South Africa, Argentina, Chile, El
Salvador, Honduras).
In all non-democratic regimes, the intelligence agencies—either military or
civilian—perpetrate egregious human rights abuses, which range from
physical and electronic surveillance, to kidnappings, arrests, and killings of
the regime’s real and imaginary enemies. Since democratic reform of
intelligence involves a tradeoff between democratic civilian control and
effectiveness of intelligence, the question is raised: Does transitional justice
have any impact on intelligence democratization? Considered here is the
degree of influence of three specific transitional justice mechanisms—
Committees of Truth and Reconciliation, archive opening, and lustration—
pertaining to intelligence reform in new democracies, and an analysis of their
relationship with the requirements for intelligence democratization:
democratic civilian control and effectiveness.3
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BACKGROUND ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Emerging democracies face a dilemma in their path to democratic
consolidation: namely, how to deal appropriately with those who participated
in, or benefited from, human rights violations, while fully committing to
democratic consolidation. Transitional justice is one tool they employ in their
endeavors to break with the past while paving the way to democracy and rule
of law. The process involves judicial and non-judicial policies and
mechanisms to address the past human rights violations.4 It consists of
criminal prosecutions, Committees of Truth and Reconciliation, opening the
non-democratic regime’s archives, lustration, among other programs and
institutional reforms.5 Transitional justice ultimately seeks to tell the truth
about the past. As Kevin Avruch and Beatriz Vejarano have observed:6
Transitional justice seeks to offer the transitional civilian governments
a way to balance their moral and legal obligations with practical
constraints. Namely to reconcile calls from different sectors of society
to either punish or forgive those responsible for past human rights
violations and to establish new and independent institutions without
precipitating a backlash from vested interests which could derail the
whole democratic transition.
Of the myriad transitional justice mechanisms, the three that are
considered here have a common denominator—truth-telling as an alternative
to prosecution and punishment.7 In this vein, Roger Errera noted: “Memory
is the ultimate form of justice.”8
COMMITTEES OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
Committees of Truth and Reconciliation (better known as Truth and
Reconciliation Committees [TRCs]) are temporary bodies, normally
established in countries that transition to democracy from repressive military
dictatorships. These countries, often undergoing internal conflict—where
human rights abuses have been massive—seek a break with the past,
encourage national reconciliation, and legitimize the new government.9 TRCs
are variously initiated by the executive branches of government, legislatures,
opposition leaders, media, human rights activists, the United Nations,
survivors of the human rights abuses, or family members of the murdered/
disappeared. They are institutional investigations of the past human rights
violations that grant both the abused and abusers opportunities to provide
their perspectives of the past.10 TRCs record their findings in written reports,
usually widely disseminated via official and informal channels.
While TRCs differ from the civil society’s endeavors of documenting the
truth, and from government committees of human rights, or committees
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND INTELLIGENCE DEMOCRATIZATION 719
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 32, NUMBER 4
monitoring post-transition abuses, they are often formally authorized by the
government.11 They have no prosecutorial powers but often work with
formal legal prosecution mechanisms.12 There is no fixed model for a TRC.
Each TRC embodies the intrinsic reality of the country in which it is created.
As Adam Czarnota notes, “While dealing with the past sounds like a
universal problem, behind it are always particularities—local settings,
relations, and structures.”13
Truth and Reconciliation Committees seek to unearth irrefutable material
proof and present it in a very convincing and scientifically impeccable way, so
that no one can argue that the killings and disappearances did not happen. 14
They are thus a symbolic “insurance against collective amnesia,”15 and
“acknowledgement” of a “truth which has long been denied.”16 In emerging
democracies TRCs work toward replacing the public’s feeling of “vengeance”
with “forgiveness.” As David K. Androff has observed, “TRCs contribute to
the rebuilding of damaged societies through the narrative process of creating a
macro-historical record (truth-seeking) and repairing the social relationships
between perpetrators and victims (reconciliation).”17
Ultimately, TRCs symbolize “a public-relations campaign selling the
‘truth’ about the past and a plan of action for the future.”18 TRCs aspire to
encourage reconciliation, define and devise future necessary changes and
reforms, recognize victims, and allow them to express their feelings about the
past, as well as to provide an official acknowledgment of a long-silenced past
as a way to prevent a return to such horrid past.19
More than forty TRCs have been formed to date, including those in
Argentina (1983–1984), Uruguay (1985), Chile (1990–1991), and
Honduras (1993), that were sponsored by each country’s executive branch; El
Salvador (1992–1993), sponsored, financed, and staffed by the United
Nations; Paraguay (1976), sponsored by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs); South Africa (1992 and 1993), sponsored by the African National
Congress (ANC); Germany (1992–1994), sponsored by the legislative branch;
and Brazil (2014), co-sponsored by the executive and legislative branches.
ARCHIVE OPENING
Opening the archives of non-democratic regimes is another form of
transitional justice. Admittedly,20 archives “document the involvement with
the former power apparatus of both ordinary citizens and in many cases
people currently in positions of authority.”21 Democratic elites view archive
openings as a useful tool to increase transparency, which in turn seeks to
legitimize the new democratic institutions and generate trust among the
population, which was lacking in the past. As Adam Michnik, emphasized,
“We must make the files public to end their power over us.”22
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To date, allowing access to the archives of the secret police has been a
Central and Eastern European phenomenon. Since the early 1990s, most of
the emerging democracies in that sector have enacted laws on opening the
state security archives of the previous Communist dictatorships.23 Scores of
people in these countries have accessed and read their files as compiled by the
intelligence agencies and thereby found out who had spied on them and
turned them in to the Communist secret police. Scholars and journalists were
able to use the archives for research and historic documentation, and
generate academic literature on the functions and operations of intelligence in
non-democratic regimes. The opening of the archives also led to the
enactment of lustration laws.
LUSTRATION
Lustration occurs mostly in countries that transitioned to democracy from
non-democratic regimes guilty of fewer massive human rights violations.
These countries are again those in Central and Eastern Europe, which
transitioned from protracted, deeply institutionalized, and totalitarian non-
democratic regimes, where the guilt for human rights abuses is primarily
collective, with almost no distinction between victims and victimizers and
whose frail civil societies render other transitional justice mechanisms nearly
impossible.24 Unlike the more brutal military dictatorships of Latin America,
where human rights violations were indubitably “grave and systematic crimes
against humanity,” the Central and Eastern European Communist regimes
tended to be less violent.25 Indeed, as Tina Rosenberg underscored, “In Latin
America, repression was deep; in Eastern Europe, it was wide.”26 Or, as
former Czech President Vaclav Havel asserted, in Central and Eastern
Europe, “the line did not run clearly between ‘Them’ and ‘Us’, but through
each individual. No one was simply a victim; everyone was in some measure
co-responsible.”27 Interestingly, Brian Grodsky equates the human rights
abuses in the European Communist dictatorships with “corruption” versus
“state violence,” and hence “violence was more psychological than
physical.”28 For these reasons, the Central and Eastern European transitional
governments chose not to prosecute most past human rights abuses.29 In
other words, “Amnesty yes, amnesia no.”30 In sum, lustration represents “a
middle-ground policy between the extremes of criminal prosecutions and
truth commissions, both of which were limited by the totalitarian nature of
the previous regimes.”31 This legislative procedure indicates who should be
excluded, from what type of positions, and for how long.32 In post-
Communist countries, most “democrats believed that their countries’ political
and economic health depended on either removing ex-Communists from
political and economic life, or at least on knowing who they were.”33
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Lustration processes differ, depending on the following: who gets
punished—e.g., those who occupied a specific position during the Communist
regimes (Germany, Czech Republic), or only those who lie about their past
(Hungary or Poland); the type of punishment—for example, job loss (Czech
Republic and Germany), formal disclosure of names (Poland); who initiates
the lustration—Parliament (Germany) versus the Executive branch.34 In
general, the lustrati are either the former leaders of the Communist Party or
the former personnel and agents of the intelligence agencies.35
Most of the former Communist countries of Europe have adopted some
sort of lustration process: Czechoslovakia (1991), the Czech Republic (1993),
Hungary (1994), Poland (1997), Bulgaria (2001), Slovakia (2003), and
Romania (2012).
TRANSPARENCY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Transitional justice paves the way toward openness and transparency in new
democracies. At the minimum, lustration, archive openings, and Truth and
Reconciliation Committees provide acknowledgment of the atrocities
endured by victims of the abuses by non-democratic regimes. They also
reveal the names of perpetrators or informants. For example, most TRCs
gathered data, evidence, and the testimonies of countless victims, families,
and even abusers, and acknowledged the past abuses. Some of them (South
Africa and El Salvador) even published the names of the non-democratic
regime’s perpetrators. Likewise, access to secret police files and lustration
policies throughout post-Communist Europe has enabled in-depth access to
Communist-era files, with sensitive data about the personnel of the
intelligence agencies, their informants and targets, and thereby exposed those
who willingly collaborated with the secret police.36 Transitional justice
mechanisms also serve as instruments of education about and prevention of
further human rights abuses. Empirical evidence from many emerging and
developing democracies in Latin America, Africa, and Central and Eastern
Europe reveals that transitional justice mechanisms have managed to provide
a candid account of the past cruelties, which not only have educated their
societies on the magnitude and inhumanity of the past non-democratic
regimes, but also increased resistance toward such abuses.
Transitional justice also confers on both the human rights victims and the
society in general a better grasp of the non-democratic past, including the
intelligence agencies’ brutal modus operandi. Paul Maddrell states that access
to the Stasi’s archives “has increased public understanding of the GDR’s
Communist regime,” adding that the disclosure of the entire Stasi informer
network has changed “historians’ understanding of how a Communist regime
controlled its people.”37 Similarly, the report of Chile’s National Committee
of Truth and Reconciliation resulted in several initiatives aimed at educating
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current and future Chilean generations about the ruthless rule of General
Augusto Pinochet’s military regime. The first step involved the creation, in
1997, of a park dedicated to the memory of the victims tortured in one of the
thousands of torture centers in Chile, called Villa Grimaldi.38 Later, in 2010,
the Memory and Human Rights Museum was established in Santiago.
Transitional justice mechanisms provide a springboard for the writing of
history, conducting investigative journalism, and compiling the academic
literature on intelligence and democratization. The access to archives in
Central and Eastern Europe and the reports of TRCs in South Africa and
Latin America have helped historians and political science scholars provide
an accurate account of the past, as well as analyze the impact of TRCs on
reconciliation, human rights protection, and democratization.39 They have
prompted journalists to publish and/or broadcast historical information
about the past, and even conduct in-depth investigations of past abuses.40
Transitional justice mechanisms throughout the world have contributed
significantly to the development of an academic literature on the intelligence
services of non-democratic regimes and contemporary efforts at the
democratic reform of intelligence. The investigations and final reports of the
TRCs in Latin America and South Africa, for instance, have provided
significant material to academics and researchers to write accurate literature
on the SIDE, SNI, and DINA services. Likewise, the archive opening in
Central and Eastern Europe has allowed academia to write on the Stasi, StB,
and the Securitate. Moreover, the post-dictatorial intelligence agencies have
themselves contributed important literature on their own or their
predecessors’ practices and abuses during the non-democratic regimes.41
Transitional justice also opens the door for accountability and democratic
civilian control of the security sector in the emerging democracies. According
to James L. Gibson, “The role of human rights and the rule of law in all this
is to create the bedrock of accountability upon which democratic legitimacy
is built.”42 In this context, lustration acts as a bridge between accountability
and reconciliation which, in Brianna Brown’s opinion, conciliates the
“backward-looking and forward-looking conceptions of justice.”43 The
recommendations included in the reports of Committees of Truth and
Reconciliation have usually led to various necessary democratic reforms,
including, among others, the development of democratic civilian control over
the security sector and an attempt at assuring its increased accountability, as
well as an enhancement of the country’s the judicial system.44 Researchers
acknowledge that the TRCs in South Africa, Honduras, and El Salvador
have resulted in the creation of accountable security institutions.45 They also
note that the TRCs have helped professionalize the judiciary in Honduras
and El Salvador.46 TRC recommendations usually contain data and evidence
to be used by the judiciary in prosecutions.47 In both Argentina and
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Honduras TRC findings played a role in criminal trials against members of
the non-democratic regimes.48
Transitional justice mechanisms also act as catalysts for institutional
reform. As Michael Deloach has noted,“Revealing the intricacies of this past
relationship that enabled abuses is a necessary step for ensuring the correct
reforms are undertaken.”49 In some Latin American countries, TRC
recommendations, even if not compulsory (except for El Salvador), have led
to military, police, and intelligence reforms aimed at professionalizing those
institutions.50 TRC recommendations have led to changes in the recruitment,
roles, missions, career paths, doctrines, education, and training of the security
institutions.51 These changes have also involved promoting and implementing
an institutional respect of human rights and ethics. In Chile, the TRCs’
recommendations regarding changing the roles and missions of the armed
forces and intelligence agencies, increasing judicial independence from the
armed forces, and the development of human rights education and training
for the security sector, have been progressively implemented.52 Likewise, in
Honduras and El Salvador, the TRCs’ recommendations for reform have
been implemented, including one that urged the provision of human rights
education/training at all levels of society, not just within the security sector.53
Access to archives and lustration have also been linked to European post-
Communist political, legal, and institutional reforms.54 As Lavinia Stan
observed: “When applied to the army, police and secret police personnel,
lustration can reform key repressive institutions.”55
Transitional justice can bring about societal transformation. TRCs, for
instance, engender reconciliation, allowing transitional governments some
necessary time to build democratic institutions and processes.56 Admittedly,
the truth and reconciliation process did not produce a secure, consolidated,
democratic South African political system (in terms of either culture or
institutions). But available evidence does suggest that some portion of the
South African “miracle” can reasonably be attributed to the success of the
Commission’s efforts to “find truth and create reconciliation.”57 Likewise,
lustration can bring about democratization. As Stan has noted:
Lustration had a valuable contribution to consolidating democracy
and making the return to communism impossible. It created
democratic bureaucracies, improved conditions for free and fair
political competition, the rule of law and constitutionalism, “refreshed”
the legal profession, stabilized democratic constitutional and legal
culture, brought transparency to the financial, banking and industrial
sectors, and removed the former corrupted nomenklatura from its
positions.58
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CHALLENGES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
The Powerful Legacy of the Past
A major challenge to transitional justice, and to democratic consolidation, is
the legacy of the past. In many cases, the privileges of the non-democratic
regime elites, be they former members of Communist Party, military officers,
intelligence agents, or the upper echelons of the bureaucracy, continue to be
enjoyed by them after the transition to democracy. These privileges are
usually negotiated during the regime change, and tend to include amnesty
deals and blanket pardons, retention of key positions in the government and
legislatures, or favored terms in private sector enterprises. The elites often
use the powers inherent in their situations to resist democratic reforms,
especially if they fear exposure of their involvement in past human rights
violations, and subsequent castigation.59 In Central and Eastern Europe, for
instance, the elites opposed the opening of the secret police archives, or even
destroyed intelligence files, because they wanted to hide their past
involvement with the regimes.60 In Latin America, the armed forces coerced
the various Presidents to delay TRC investigations, discourage the
dissemination of TRC reports, block the passage of amnesty laws, or prevail
upon them to grant blanket pardons, whenever the military perceived the
likelihood of exposure of past human rights abuses.61 Opponents to the
imposition of transitional justice often veil their resistance to these
mechanisms by expressing concern for effective national reconciliation. In
post-Communist Romania, for example, Ion Iliescu, who succeeded Nicolae
Ceausescu as President, attempted to resist lustration on grounds that it
would hinder reconciliation.62
Legacy of the past involves not only resistance to transitional justice, but
also resistance to future reforms. With few notable exceptions,63 after a
regime change the new agencies tend to preserve the personnel, venues, and
other assets of the non-democratic intelligence services. The residual
personnel not only perpetuate the previous abuses, but they retain access to
information and files in order to halt attempts at reforming the agencies,
particularly if they fear losing the privileges and powers they held during the
non-democratic regime.64
Political Will versus Political Gain
Another challenge to transitional justice involves the lack of political will
which, coupled with an interest in political gain, negatively affects the
creation or implementation of transitional justice. The duration of the non-
democratic regime tends to diminish the political elites’ interest in bringing
about transitional justice. In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, the
lengthy Communist regimes curbed the elites’ interest in establishing Truth
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and Reconciliation Committees. In most cases, those countries eventually
opted to devise lustration policies, or enact laws on archive opening, but only
very late in the democratization process.65 Yet political gain can also
stimulate the elites’ will to bring about transitional justice. TRCs are
susceptible to politicization, in that governments tend to create them as
facades of good human rights policies and practices aimed at distorting
public opinion.66 Some Latin America TRCs, for example, were created by
the governments to ensure electoral support and gain.67
Access to archives also opens a Pandora’s Box of dirty political games.
Statistics often reveal that the archives of the Central and Eastern European
intelligence agencies have become tools for humiliation, blackmail, revenge,
and discrediting.68 Nevertheless, of the three transitional justice mechanisms
mentioned here, lustration is the most predisposed to politicization. Some
analysts have suggested that lustration is “more political than judicial,”69 in
that political elites manipulate the process to acquire legitimacy and electoral
gain, and/or blackmail, humiliate, and eliminate political opponents. These
actions ultimately hinder the degree to which lustration could fulfill society’s
demands for justice.70 But the politicization of lustration tends to be
temporary, admittedly more blatant in the immediate aftermath of a regime
change, since, as Lavinia Stan has noted, it contributes to democratic
consolidation. 71
And the Prevarication Shall Set You Free … Or Not?
A particular shortcoming of lustration (and of the handling of the old
regime’s files) is its failure to distinguish between volunteers and forced
informants. Hence, it can distort the veracity of the findings regarding the
lustrati.72 Stan observed that “the individual agency of secret
spies… sometimes fabricated information and even recorded fictitious
persons as informers in an effort to boost their chances for promotion.”73 In
addition, in many countries the intelligence agencies destroyed considerable
portions of the archives, particularly at the beginning of a transition, thereby
possibly altering the veracity of findings. Of the Central and Eastern
European countries, only the Czech Republic amended its Lustration Law to
address individual circumstances of involvement with the Communist-era
secret police, the StB.74
Another shortcoming of lustration involves the future careers of the
intelligence lustrati. Many go into profitable businesses, some using
unregistered funding, while others create parallel private intelligence services
which compete with the government institutions.75 They often continue their
connections with past informers and collaborators, making use of
information extracted from agency files for blackmail. All of this
maneuvering ultimately increases corruption. Researchers note that many
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lustrated personnel in Central and Eastern Europe have been “wielding more
influence as businessmen than they would have had if they had remained in
the public service.”76
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTELLIGENCE
Despite challenges, transitional justice is relevant to the reform of intelligence
in emerging democracies and the level of its influence on intelligence
democratization can be measured. Utilizing the metrics of democratic civilian
control and effectiveness developed by Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina
Cristiana Matei,77 values have been assigned, ranging from absent or
minimal influence (for no visible impact) to high influence to each
requirement for achieving the democratic civilian control and effectiveness of
intelligence. A summary of the findings is included in Table 1.
Influence on the Requirements for Control
Transitional justice has a moderate influence on the control dimension of
democratic reform of intelligence. Of the three requirements for control,
transitional justice seems to have the greatest influence on institutional
control mechanisms and professional norms.
With regard to institutional control mechanisms, transitional justice has a
relatively moderate influence, in that it encourages the crafting of
intelligence- and security-related legal frameworks, among them rules and
regulations on the protection of human rights. Also affected is the
establishment of institutions, including civilian-led agencies, which in turn
leads to the development of accountability and transparency over the
intelligence. Of the three transitional justice mechanisms analyzed here, the
TRCs seem to have the most influence on institutional control mechanisms,
while archive openings, and lustration, have less.
Transitional justice has a moderate influence on professional norms.
The findings of TRCs, along with the exposure of the past through the
opening of archives and lustration, motivate policymakers to bring about
changes in expertise, responsibility, and structure and nature of their
intelligence agencies. Among them are new recruitment requirements,
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including non-involvement in any human rights violation; revised roles and
missions for the agencies; and new education and training, with a focus on
human rights and institutional ethics.
In terms of oversight, transitional justice has a lesser influence, mostly
involving formal executive and legislative changes to the legal bases with
regard to the roles and missions of intelligence, and at times providing for
investigations in judicial courts. Overall, then, its impact on intelligence
oversight is modest at best. Yet, transitional justice, through the press, the
writing of history, and the compiling of literature on intelligence, contributes
to increasing the awareness of formal oversight bodies of the need for
intelligence in a democracy. But it does not seem to contribute to an increase
in the expertise of the civilian units that oversee intelligence.
Influence on the Requirements for Effectiveness
If transitional justice seems to have at least a moderate influence on the
control aspect, its influence on effectiveness is rather minimal. It has a
moderate impact on plans, mostly involving revised intelligence and/or
military doctrines, often as the result of TRC recommendations, lustration,
or archive openings.
With regard to institutions, transitional justice findings and reports may
increase the knowledge and improve the education of leaders within the
executive branch, enabling them to better invest in security and intelligence,
and draw improved policies and strategies. But not all leaders have the
political will to develop robust institutions, nor is transitional justice the only
catalyst for developing them. The media, for example, tend to bring about
more responsive governments.
With regard to resources and effectiveness, the influence of transitional
justice is minimal, even absent. TRC findings, archive openings, and
lustration actually tend to encourage decisionmakers to cut
intelligence resources.
DEMOCRATIZATION NEEDS (MORE THAN) TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Transitional justice makes only a modest contribution to intelligence
democratization. At minimum, its mechanisms provide a depiction of the
non-democratic past. At maximum, they stimulate a debate on democracy,
intelligence, and human rights in the new democracies, and act as catalysts
for some intelligence-related reforms. In this context, to paraphrase Lavinia
Stan, while direct connections between transitional justice and intelligence
democratization are difficult to draw, the development of democratic civilian
control and effectiveness of intelligence has not been impeded by the
process.78 Countries that created TRCs or adopted lustration, notably South
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Africa and Central Europe, are more advanced in finding a tradeoff between
the control and effectiveness of intelligence, as compared to those that did
not pursue transitional justice, namely some western Balkan states and all
former Soviet republics except for the Baltic states.
Nonetheless, transitional justice alone is neither necessary nor sufficient to
ensure either reconciliation or intelligence democratization. For example,
Spain, which did not pursue transitional justice, has achieved considerable
progress in democratizing its post-dictatorial intelligence services, due to
political will, even if inconsistent at times, and an external impetus led by the
media and Madrid’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European
Union membership obligations. Countries that pursued transitional justice
and succeeded in democratizing their intelligence agencies owe their progress
not only to transitional justice, but also to myriad efforts to undertake
democratic institutional transformation—such as cultural, societal, political,
judicial, and security sector reform—aimed at assuring that its intelligence
agencies are under democratic civilian control and functionally effective.
And, finally, time has been a key catalyst for healing deep wounds,
permitting reconciliation, and achieving the democratic reform of
intelligence.
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